Characteristics of Philippine literature during Japanese occupation 1. The Philippine literature during that time is full of chaos, war, because of Japanese occupation. 2. Filipinos during that time surrender but instead of giving up till the end they fight together with general Douglas MacArthur 3. The Philippines is conquered by Japanese but because of guerrillas some islands are conquered. 4. Japanese had pressed large numbers of Filipinos into work details and even put young Filipino women into brothels.
Japan launched an attack on the Philippines on December 8, 1941, just ten hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor.
Initial aerial bombardment was followed by landings of ground troops both north and south of Manila. The defending Philippine and United States troops were under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, who had been recalled to active duty in the United States Army earlier in the year and was designated commander of the United States Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The aircraft of his command were destroyed; the naval forces were ordered to leave; and because of the circumstances in the Pacific region, reinforcement and resupply of his ground forces were impossible.
Under the pressure of superior numbers, the defending forces withdrew to the Bataan Peninsula and to the island of Corregidor at the entrance to Manila Bay. Manila, declared an open city to prevent its destruction, was occupied by the Japanese on January 2, 1942.
The Philippine defense continued until the final surrender of United States-Philippine forces on the Bataan Peninsula in April 1942 and on Corregidor in May. Most of the 80,000 prisoners of war captured by the Japanese at Bataan were forced to undertake the infamous “Bataan Death March” to a prison camp 105 kilometers to the north. It is estimated that as many as 10,000 men, weakened by disease and malnutrition and treated harshly by their captors, died before reaching their destination. Quezon and Osmeña had accompanied the troops to Corregidor and later left for the United States, where they set up a government-in-exile. MacArthur was ordered to Australia, where he started to plan for a return to the Philippines.
The Japanese military authorities immediately began organizing a new government structure in the Philippines. Although the Japanese had promised independence for the islands after occupation, they initially organized a Council of State through which they directed civil affairs until October 1943, when they declared the Philippines an independent republic. Most of the Philippine elite, with a few notable exceptions, served under the Japanese. Philippine collaboration in Japanese-sponsored political institutions – which later became a major domestic political issue – was motivated by several considerations. Among them was the effort to protect the people from the harshness of Japanese rule (an effort that Quezon himself had advocated), protection of family and personal interests, and a belief that Philippine nationalism would be advanced by solidarity with fellow Asians. Many collaborated to pass information to the Allies. The Japanese-sponsored republic headed by President José P. Laurel proved to be unpopular.
Japanese occupation of the Philippines was opposed by active and successful underground and guerrilla activity that increased over the years which eventually covered a big portion of the country. Opposing these guerrillas were a Japanese-formed Bureau of Constabulary (later taking the name of the old Constabulary during the Second Republic), Kempeitai, and the Makapili.Postwar investigations showed that about 260,000 people were in guerrilla organizations and that members of the anti-Japanese underground were even more numerous. Such was their effectiveness that by the end of the war, Japan controlled only twelve of the forty-eight provinces. The Philippine guerrilla movement continued to grow, in spite of Japanese campaigns against them.
Throughout Luzon and the southern islands Filipinos joined various groups and vowed to fight the Japanese. The commanders of these groups made contact with one another, argued about who was in charge of what territory, and began to formulate plans to assist the return of American forces to the islands. They gathered important intelligence information and smuggled it out to the American Army, a process that sometimes took months. General MacArthur formed a clandestine operation to support the guerrillas. He had Lieutenant Commander Charles “Chick” Parsons smuggle guns, radios and supplies to them by submarine. The guerrilla forces, in turn, built up their stashes of arms and explosives and made plans to assist MacArthur’s invasion by sabotaging Japanese communications lines and attacking Japanese forces from the rear.
Various guerrilla forces formed throughout the archipelago, ranging from groups of U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) forces who refused to surrender to local militia initially organized to combat banditry brought about by disorder caused by the invasion. Several islands in the Visayas region had guerrilla forces led by Filipino officers, such as Colonel Macario Peralta in Panay, Major Ismael Ingeniero in Bohol, and Captain Salvador Abcede in Negros. The island of Mindanao, being farthest from the center of Japanese occupation, had 38,000 guerrillas that were eventually consolidated under the command of American civil engineer Colonel Wendell Fertig.
One resistance group in the Central Luzon area was known as the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon), or the People’s Anti-Japanese Army organized in early 1942 under the leadership of Luis Taruc, a communist party member since 1939. The Huks armed some 30,000 people and extended their control over portions of Luzon. However, guerrilla activities on Luzon were hampered due to heavy Japanese presence and infighting of the various groups, including Hukbalahap troops attacking American-led guerrilla units. Lack of equipment, difficult terrain and undeveloped infrastructure made coordination of these groups nearly impossible, and for several months in 1942 all contact was lost with Philippine resistance forces.
Communications were restored in November 1942 when the reformed Philippine 61st Division on Panay island led by Colonel Macario Peralta was able to establish radio contact with the USAFFE command in Australia. This enabled the forwarding of intelligence regarding Japanese forces in the Philippines to SWPA command as well as consolidating the once sporadic guerrilla activities and allowing the guerrillas to help in the war effort. Among the signal units of Col Peralta were the 61 Signal Company manned by 2LtLudovico Arroyo Bañas, which was attached to forces of the 6th Military Division, stationed in Passi, Iloilo, under the command of Capt. Eliseo Espia; and the 64th Signal Company of the same Military Division, under the Command of LtCol. Cesar Hechanova, to which 2Lt. Bañas was given the responsibility sometime later.
Increasing amounts of supplies and radio were delivered by submarine to aid the guerrilla effort. By the time of the Leyte invasion, four submarines were dedicated exclusively to the delivery of supplies to the guerrillas. Other guerrilla units were attached to the SWPA, and were active throughout the archipelago. Some of these units were organized or directly connected to pre-surrender units ordered to mount guerrilla actions. An example of this was Troop C, 26th Cavalry. Other guerrilla units were made up of former Philippine Army and Philippine Scouts soldiers who had been released from POW camps by the Japanese.
Others were combined units of Americans, military and civilian, who had never surrendered or had escaped after surrendering, and Filipinos, Christians and Moros, who had initially formed their own small units. Colonel Wendell Fertig organized such a group on Mindanao that not only effectively resisted the Japanese, but formed a complete government that often operated in the open throughout the island. Some guerrilla units would later be assisted by American submarines who delivered supplies, evacuate refugees and injured, as well as inserted individuals and whole units, such as the 5217th Reconnaissance Battalion, and Alamo Scouts. By the end of the war some 277 separate guerrilla units made up of some 260,715 individuals fought in the resistance movement.Select units of the resistance would go on to be reorganized and equipped as units of the Philippine Army and Constabulary.
End of the occupation
When General MacArthur returned to the Philippines with his army late in 1944, he was well supplied with information. It has been said that by the time MacArthur returned, he knew what every Japanese lieutenant ate for breakfast and where he had his hair cut. But the return was not easy. The Japanese Imperial General Staff decided to make the Philippines their final line of defense, and to stop the American advance toward Japan. They sent every available soldier, airplane and naval vessel into the defense of the Philippines. The Kamikaze corps was created specifically to defend the Philippines. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the biggest naval battle of World War II, and the campaign to re-take the Philippines was the bloodiest campaign of the Pacific War.
But intelligence information gathered by the guerrillas averted a bigger disaster—they revealed the plans of Japanese General Yamashita to entrap MacArthur’s army, and they led the liberating soldiers to the Japanese fortifications. MacArthur’s Allied forces landed on the island of Leyte on October 20, 1944, accompanied byOsmeña, who had succeeded to the commonwealth presidency upon the death of Quezon on August 1, 1944. Landings then followed on the island of Mindoro and around the Lingayen Gulfon the west side of Luzon, and the push toward Manila was initiated. The Commonwealth of the Philippines was restored. Fighting was fierce, particularly in the mountains of northern Luzon, where Japanese troops had retreated, and in Manila, where they put up a last-ditch resistance. The Philippine Commonwealth troops and the recognized guerrilla fighter units rose up everywhere for the final offensive.
Filipino guerrillas also played a large role during the liberation. One guerrilla unit came to substitute for a regularly constituted American division, and other guerrilla forces of battalion and regimental size supplemented the efforts of the U.S. Army units. Moreover, the loyal and willing Filipino population immeasurably eased the problems of supply, construction,civil administration and furthermore eased the task of Allied forces in recapturing the country. Fighting continued until Japan’s formal surrender on September 2, 1945. The Philippines had suffered great loss of life and tremendous physical destruction by the time the war was over. An estimated 1 million Filipinos had been killed from all causes; of these 131,028 were listed as killed in seventy-two war crime events. U.S. casualties were 10,380 dead and 36,550 wounded; Japanese dead were 255,795.
A Japanese soldier stand in front of US propaganda, in the Philippines.
American period 1898–1946
This article covers the history of the Philippines from 1898 to 1946 and spans the Spanish-American War (after which the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain) and the subsequent Philippine–American War, the Philippines as a U.S. territory, the Philippine Commonwealth, the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the World War II, and Philippine independence from the U.S. in 1946. (but I will not include the Japanese occupation because I already did in previous topic)
*The Katipunan revolution which had begun in 1896 had formally ended with the Pact of Biak-na-Bato, a truce between the Spanish government and the principal revolutionary leaders which had been signed in November 1897. Emilio Aguinaldo, who held the office of President in the revolutionary government, and other revolutionary leaders were given amnesty and a monetary indemnity by the Spanish government in return for which the rebel government had agreed to go into voluntary exile in Hong Kong.
Spanish-American War period (1898)
On April 19, 1898, following on a joint congressional resolution, U.S. President William McKinley signed an ultimatum demanding that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. This resulted on April 20 in a declaration of war against the United States by Spain, followed on April 25 by a declaration of war by the U.S. against Spain. ————————————————-
On February 25, 1898, following the sinking of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor on February 15, Theodore Roosevelt sent the following cable to Commodore George Dewey, commanding the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic Squadron:
“| Order the squadron, except the Monocacy, to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.| ”| The gunboat USS Monocacy was at the time on assignment to carry the U.S. Minister to China on visits to the open ports on the Yangtze River. On April 24 word was received that the U.S. and Spain were at war, and the squadron was ordered by the British (a non-belligerent) to leave Hong Kong. It first moved 30 miles north to Mirs Bay on the Chinese coast and the departed from there for the Philippines on April 27, reaching Manila Bay on the evening of April 30.
Battle of Manila Bay
The first battle of the Spanish-American war took place in the Philippines. On May 1, 1898. In a matter of hours, Commodore Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron defeated the Spanish squadron under Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón. The U.S. squadron took control of the arsenal and navy yard at Cavite and Dewey cabled Washington stating that, although he controlled Manila Bay, he needed 5000 men to seize Manila itself.
U.S. preparation for land operations and resumption of the Philippine revolution
The completeness of Dewey’s victory, so early in the war, prompted the administration of President William McKinley to send the troops necessary to capture Manila from the Spanish. The U.S. Army sent substantially more than Dewey asked for, the 10,844 man VIII Corps (PE), under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt. Meanwhile, Dewey dispatched the cutter McCulloch to Hong Kong to transport Aguinaldo to the Philippines. Aguinaldo arrived on May 19 and, after a brief meeting with Dewey, resumed revolutionary activities against the Spanish. Public jubilance marked the Aguinaldo’s return. Several revolutionaries, as well as Filipino soldiers employed by the Spanish army, submitted themselves to Aguinaldo’s command and the Philippine Revolution against Spain resumed. Soon, Imus and Bacoor in Cavite,Parañaque and Las Piñas in Morong, Macabebe and San Fernando in Pampanga, as well as Laguna, Batangas, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija,Bataan, Tayabas (now Quezon), and the Camarines provinces, were liberated by the Filipinos and the port of Dalahican in Cavite was secured. The revolution was gaining ground. On May 24, 1898, in Cavite, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation in which he assumed command of all Philippine forces and established a dictatorial government with himself as dictator.
Philippine declaration of independence and establishment of Philippine governments
On 12 June 1898, at Aguinaldo’s ancestral home in Cavite, Philippine independence was proclaimed and The Act of Declaration of Philippine Independence was read. The act had been prepared and written by Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista in Spanish, who also read it. The act opens with the following words: “| In the town of Cavite-Viejo, Province of Cavite, this 12th day of June 1898:BEFORE ME, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, War Counsellor and Special Delegate designated to proclaim and solemnize this Declaration of Independence by the Dictatorial Government of the Philippines, pursuant to, and by virtue of, a Decree issued by the Engregious Dictator Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, …| ”| On 18 June, Aguinaldo issued a decree formally establishing his dictatorial government. On June 23, Aguinaldo issued a decree replacing his dictatorial government with a revolutionary government, with himself as President. Aguinaldo later claimed that an American naval officer urged him to return to the Philippines to fight the Spanish and said “The United States is a great and rich nation and needs no colonies”.
Aguinaldo said that after checking with Dewey by telegraph, U.S. Consul E. Spencer Pratt had assured him in Singapore: “That the United States would at least recognize the Independence of the Philippines under the protection of the United States Navy. The Consul added that there was no necessity for entering into a formal written agreement because the word of the Admiral and of the United States Consul were in fact equivalent to the most solemn pledge that their verbal promises and assurance would be fulfilled to the letter and were not to be classed with Spanish promises or Spanish ideas of a man’s word of honour. Aguinaldo received nothing in writing. On April 28 Pratt wrote the Secretary of State, explaining he had met Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done: “| “At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong | ”|
There was no mention in the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed of any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these details being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought that he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.” and says that a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made the following statement:– “| “I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would cooperate with him–General Aguinaldo–for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward.”| ”|
On June 16 Secretary Day cabled Consul Pratt: “Avoid unauthorized negotiations with the Philippine insurgents,” and the Secretary wrote the consul on the same day “| The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United States; and, in the absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of GeneralAguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not he practicable to gratify. This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from this Government any recognition.
The United States, in entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due from them.If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would co-operate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his co-operation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and can not be approved.| ”| Filipino scholar Maximo Kalaw wrote in 1927: “A few of the principal facts, however, seem quite clear. Aguinaldo was not made to understand that, in consideration of Filipino cooperation, the United States would extend its sovereignty over the Islands, and thus in place of the old Spanish master a new one would step in. The truth was that nobody at the time ever thought that the end of the war would result in the retention of the Philippines by the United States.” Tensions between U.S. and revolutionary forces
This and some subsequent sections of this article extensively cite portions of Worcester’s 1914 book which rely heavily on “insurgent documents” — documents of Aguinaldo’s government which, after being captured by U.S. forces, were translated into English from the original Tagalog and Spanish and were compiled and annotated by U.S. Army Captain John R. M. Taylor. In his letter of transmittal for the compilation, Taylor wrote that the documents in the compilation “| These telegrams were found by me while in charge of the division of military information, adjutant-general’s office, Division of the Philippines, among a mass of papers captured from the so-called insurgent government. I do not suppose that they are by any means all the telegrams received by Aguinaldo between June, 1898 and March, 1899.
They are merely papers which have survived the vicissitudes of warfare and the series must necessarily be incomplete, but they show, to me at least, that Aguinaldo relied much on the opinion and advice of other men; that there was serious opposition to his government even in Luzon; that it had been fully determined to attack the Americans in Manila upon a favorable opportunity, and that in the event of the success of this attack the so-called insurgent government would not have continued even to call itself a republic. A republic does not award titles of nobility.| ”| The first contingent of American troops under General Thomas Anderson, arrived on 30 June, the second under General Frank V. Greene on July 17, and the third under General Arthur MacArthur on July 30. General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo requesting his cooperation in military operations against the Spanish forces. Aguinaldo responded, thanking General Anderson for his amicable sentiments, but saying nothing about military cooperation; General Anderson did not renew the request.
In a July 9, 1898 letter, General Anderson informed the Adjutant-General (AG) of the United States Army that Aguinaldo “has declared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance.”, opining that that would not be probable but, if done, would allow him to antagonize any U.S. attempt to establish a provisional government. On July 15, 1898, Aguinaldo issued three organic decrees assuming civil authority of the Philippines. On July 18, General Anderson wrote that he suspected Aguinaldo to be secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities. In a 21 July letter to the Adjunt General, General Anderson wrote the Adjudant General that he had ignored Aguinaldo’s assumption of civil authority, and had let him know verbally that he could, and would, not recognize it. In another July 21 letter, General Anderson said: “Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order.”
On July 24, Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. Murat Halstead, official historian of the Philippine Expedition writes that General Merritt remarked shortly after his arrival on 25 June, “As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that ‘the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,’ I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.”
U.S. commanders suspected that Aguinaldo and his forces were informing the Spanish of American movements. Major J. R. M. Taylor later wrote, after translating and analyzing insurgent documents, “The officers of the United States Army who believed that the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo’s information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire.”
Peace protocol between the U.S. and Spain
On August 12, 1898, the New York Times reported that a peace protocol had been signed in Washington at 4:23 that afternoon between the U.S. and Spain, suspending hostilities and defining the terms on which peace negotiations are to be carried on between the two. Due to time zone differences, this was in the very early morning of 13 August in Manila. The text of the protocol was not made public until November 5, but Article 3 read: “The United States will occupy and hold the City, Bay, and Harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.”
Capture of Manila
Main article: Battle of Manila (1898)
On the evening of August 12, on orders of General Merritt, General Anderson notified Aguinaldo to forbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. On 13 August, unaware of the peace protocol signing, U.S. forces assaulted and captured the Spanish positions in Manila. Insurgents made an independent attack of their own, as planned, which promptly led to trouble with the Americans. At 8 A.M. Aguinaldo received a telegram from General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enter Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south side of the Pasig River. No attention was paid to General Anderson’s request that the Insurgent troops should not enter Manila without permission. They crowded forward with and after the American forces and found American and Spanish troops confronting each other but not firing. A flag of truce was waving from the Spanish, nevertheless the insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers. General Anderson’s losses in the taking of the city was nineteen men killed and one hundred and three wounded.
General Anderson, sent Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latter at 6:35 P.M., as follows “| Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to Gen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces.–Manila, taken. Serious trouble threatened between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your troops should not force themselves in the city until we have received the full surrender then we will negotiate with you._Anderson_, commanding.| ”| Aguinaldo demanded joint occupation of Manila. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informed their superiors of this and asked how far they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter. General Merritt received news of the August 12 peace protocol on August 16, three days after the surrender of Manila. Admiral dewey and General Merritt were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the President of the United States had directed: “| That there must be no joint occupation with the Insurgents. The United States in the possession of Manila city, Manila bay and harbor must preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces.
The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end.| ”| Insurgent forces were looting the portions of the city which they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by their own records were not confining their attacks to Spaniards, but were assaulting their own people and raiding the property of foreigners as well, and U.S. commanders pressed Aguinaldo to withdraw his forces from Manila. Negotiations proceeded slowly and, on August 31, General Elwell Otis (General Merritt being unavailable) wrote, in a long letter to Aguinaldo: “… I am compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short space of time should you decline to comply with my Government’s demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city’s defences before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.”
After some further negotiation and exchanges of letters Aguinaldo wrote on September 16: “On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, …” In later congressional testimony in the U.S., Dewey described an arrangement he had made with the Spanish commander for the surrender of Manila: “That the Spaniards were ready to surrender, but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I selected one at Malate, away from the city. They said I must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to make a signal by the international code, ‘Do you surrender?’ Then they were to hoist a white flag at a certain bastion; and I may say now that I was the first one to discover the white flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while, and then made the signal according to the programme. We could not see the white flag—it was rather a thick day—but finally I discovered it on the south bastion; I don’t know how long it had been flying there when I first saw it.”
U.S. and insurgents clash
In a clash at Cavite between United States soldiers and insurgents on August 25, George Hudson, a member of the Utah regiment, was killed, Corporal William Anderson, of the same battery, was mortally wounded, and four troopers of the Fourth Cavalry were slightly wounded. This provoked general Anderson to send Aguinaldo a letter saying, “In order to avoid the very serious misfortune of an encounter between our troops, I demand your immediate withdrawal with your guard from Cavite. One of my men has been killed and three wounded by your people. This is positive and does not admit of explanation or delay.”
Internal insurgent communications reported that the Americans were drunk at the time. Halstead writes that Aguinaldo expressed his regret and promised to punish the offenders. In internal insurgent communications, Apolinario Mabini initially proposed to investigate and punish any offenders identified. Aguinaldo modified this, ordering, “… say that he was not killed by your soldiers, but by them themselves (the Americans) since they were drunk according to your telegram” An Insurgent officer in Cavite at the time reported on his record of services that he: “took part in the movement against the Americans on the afternoon of the 24th of August, under the orders of the commander of the troops and the adjutant of the post.”
Philippine elections, Malolos Congress, Constitutional government Elections were held by the Revolutionary Government between June and September 10, resulting in Emilio Aguinaldo being seated as President in the seating of a legislature known as the Malolos Congress. In a session between September 15 and November 13, 1898, the Malolos Constitution was adopted, creating the First Philippine Republic. Negros Revolution and Republic of Negros
November 6, 1898 was the day that the Negros Revolution concluded. The Cantonal Republic of Negros was established on November 27, 1898 and ended on April 30, 1901. Spanish-American War ends Article V of the peace protocol signed on August 12 had mandated negotiations to conclude a treaty of peace to begin in Paris not later than October 1, 1898. President McKinley sent a five man commission, initially instructed to demand no more than Luzon, Guam, and Puerto Rico; which would have provided a limited U.S. empire of pinpoint colonies to support a global fleet and provide communication links. In Paris, the commission was besieged with advice, particularly from American generals and European diplomats, to demand the entire Philippine archipelago. The unanimous recommendation was that “it would certainly be cheaper and more humane to take the entire Philippines than to keep only part of it.”
On 28 October 1898, McKinley wired the commission that “cessation of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds.The cessation must be the whole archipeligo or none.The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required.” The Spanish negotiators were furious over the “immodist demands of a conqueror”, but their wounded pride was assauged by an offer of twenty million dollars for “Spanish improvements” to the islands. The Spaniards capitulated, and on December 10, 1898, the U.S. and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, formally ending the Spanish-American war. In Article III, Spain ceded the Philippine archipelago to the United States, as follows: “Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line: [… geographic description elided …].
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.” In the U.S., there was a movement for Philippine independence; some said that the U.S. had no right to a land where many of the people wanted self-government. In 1898, Andrew Carnegie, an industrialist and steel magnate, offered to buy the Philippines for twenty million United States dollars and give it to the Filipinos so that they could be free of United States government. On November 7, 1900, Spain and the U.S. signed the Treaty of Washington, clarifying that the territories relinquished by Spain to the United States included any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, but lying outside the lines described in the Treaty of Paris. That treaty explicitly named the islands of Cagayan Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies as among the relinquished territories.